Yong Zheng v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-20-2012 
Yong Zheng v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Yong Zheng v. Attorney General United States" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 559. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/559 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-1327 
____________ 
 
YONG SHENG ZHENG, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                                                                      Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A073-524-429) 
Immigration Judge: Paul Grussendorf 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 15, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, ALDISERT and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 20, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Yong Sheng Zheng (“Zheng”) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals‟ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
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 Zheng,  a native and citizen of China, entered the United States in 1995 without 
inspection.  He was found removable in 1996, and he was granted voluntary departure 
after withdrawing his asylum application.  Zheng did not depart the United States.  His 
removal proceedings later were reopened at his request, and he applied for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.  On 
November 3, 2000, and following a merits hearing, an Immigration Judge denied his 
applications for relief, finding that he did not testify credibly.  The IJ again granted 
voluntary departure.  On November 25, 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
dismissed Zheng‟s appeal but did not reinstate the order of voluntary departure.   
 On November 16, 2006, nearly four years after his order of removal to China 
became final, Zheng filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings based on an approved 
visa petition filed by his United States citizen brother.  On June 1, 2007, the Board denied 
the motion, concluding that it was time-barred.  The Board noted that, had the motion 
been timely filed, it would have been denied anyway on the ground that Zheng was not 
eligible to adjust his status because a visa was not yet available. 
 On January 2, 2008, Zheng filed another motion to reopen based on the approved 
visa petition but again his priority date was not current.  On April 30, 2008, the Board 
denied the motion as time- and number-barred.  The Board declined to exercise its 
discretionary authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, again noting that a visa was 
not yet available. 
 At issue in the instant petition for review, on December 17, 2010, Zheng filed yet 
another motion to reopen removal proceedings.  In this motion, Zheng claimed that he 
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had become eligible to adjust his status based on the approved visa petition because he 
now had a current priority date.  Zheng asked the Board to sua sponte reopen the 
proceedings.  He claimed that his elderly father, who is a United States citizen, would 
suffer hardship if he is removed because his father is ill.  Zheng further argued that the 
time to file his motion to reopen should be equitably tolled because his former counsel 
failed to advise him of the consequences of failing to voluntarily depart the United States.  
Zheng also claimed that he was not advised by the IJ at his merits hearing in 2000 of the 
consequences of failing to depart.  The Department of Homeland Security opposed the 
motion to reopen. 
On January 19, 2012, the Board denied Zheng‟s latest motion to reopen as time- 
and number-barred.  The Board held that Zheng did not demonstrate that any of the 
exceptions to the timeliness requirement, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), applied to his case.  
Moreover, with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and request for 
equitable tolling, Zheng did not sufficiently show due diligence, prejudice, or compliance 
with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988).  
Zheng did not explain why he waited over 10 years from the IJ‟s November, 2000 
decision to complain about the IJ‟s failure to give notice of the consequences of failing to 
depart, and he did not include a copy of the disciplinary complaint he allegedly submitted 
to the bar concerning former counsel‟s conduct.  As to the issue of prejudice, Zheng was 
not eligible for adjustment of status within the ninety-day period permitted for reopening 
removal proceedings, so any failure of former counsel to advise him of the consequences 
of failing to depart was not reasonably likely to have changed the result in his case, see 
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Calla-Collado v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2011).  Moreover, the 
order of voluntary departure was not reinstated when the Board dismissed Zheng‟s appeal 
on November 25, 2002.  Last, the Board concluded that Zheng had not shown exceptional 
circumstances warranting an exercise of its discretionary authority to reopen the 
proceedings sua sponte.  The Board recognized the evidence of hardship to Zheng‟s 
father if Zheng is removed but found such hardship unexceptional.   
 Zheng has timely petitioned for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a), (b)(1), except that we lack jurisdiction to review the Board‟s discretionary 
decision declining to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings.  See Calle-
Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).
1
  In his brief, Zheng argues that the 
Board in its November 25, 2002 decision wrongfully applied 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(h) and 
erred in not reinstating the order of voluntary departure (Petitioner‟s Brief, at 12); and 
that he is not subject to the “failure to depart” immigration benefits bar because the IJ 
failed to inform him during the 2000 proceedings of the consequences of failing to 
depart, in violation of due process (Petitioner‟s Brief, at 13).  We also lack jurisdiction to 
consider these arguments.  The present petition for review, filed on February 8, 2012, is 
                                              
1
 Zheng argues that, in considering the issue of hardship to his father, the Board failed to 
consider his evidence adequately and failed to explain its decision not to exercise its 
discretionary authority sua sponte (Petitioner‟s Brief, at 22).  Under the standards we set 
forth in Zheng v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 549 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2008), the agency must 
explicitly consider any country conditions evidence that materially bears on an 
applicant‟s claim and provide more than a cursory explanation for its decision, see id. at 
268.  We have never extended Zheng‟s requirements to the Board‟s unreviewable 
discretionary decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  In any event, we are satisfied that the 
Board adequately considered the evidence of hardship to Zheng‟s United States citizen 
father in declining to reopen proceedings sua sponte. 
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untimely with respect to the Board‟s November 25, 2002 decision, see id. at § 1252(b)(1) 
(providing for a 30-day period in which to file a petition for review), and the time limit 
for filing a petition for review is mandatory and jurisdictional, see McAllister v. Att‟y 
Gen. of U.S., 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2006).  Zheng‟s motion in this Court to stay 
removal previously was denied. 
We will deny the petition for review.  We review the denial of a motion to reopen 
for an abuse of discretion.  Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 
323 (1992).   The Supreme Court has stated that “[m]otions for reopening of immigration 
proceedings are disfavored,” noting that “as a general matter, every delay works to the 
advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States.”  Id. 
Under the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we will not overturn the Board‟s 
decision unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 
F. 3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  We uphold the Board‟s factual determinations underlying 
the denial of the motion to reopen if they are “„supported by reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.‟”  Zheng v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 
549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). 
We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
Zheng‟s motion to reopen was untimely filed and that equitable tolling was not 
warranted.  A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of a final 
administrative order of removal.  See, e.g., Pllumi v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 642 F.3d 155, 
161 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)).  Zheng‟s motion, which was 
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filed approximately eight years after the entry of his final order of removal, was untimely.  
Moreover, Zheng does not argue that one of the statutory or regulatory exceptions applies 
in his case, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (time limit for 
motion to reopen does not apply if motion relates to asylum application and is based on 
changed country conditions). 
 In Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2005), we held that 
attorney conduct can provide a basis for equitable tolling of the ninety-day deadline, but 
failure to exercise due diligence in asserting ineffective assistance of counsel undermines 
any claim for equitable tolling of the motion to reopen deadline.  See also Borges v. 
Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 407 (3d Cir. 2005).  “Equitable tolling is an extraordinary 
remedy which should be extended only sparingly.”  Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 253 (quoting 
Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005)).   Having waited more than 
10 years after the IJ granted him voluntary departure in November, 2000 to complain 
about counsel‟s failure to advise him about the consequences of failing to depart, Zheng 
plainly cannot show that he exercised the diligence required for the doctrine of equitable 
tolling to apply.  Zheng argues in his brief that he did not learn of the significance of 
former counsel‟s alleged deficient performance until he consulted new counsel in 2010 
(Petitioner‟s Brief, at 18), but counsel‟s alleged ineffectiveness could have been 
discovered well before 2010 had Zheng exercised the required diligence.  See Rashid v. 
Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (due diligence must be exercised over entire 
period for which tolling is desired including the period when the ineffectiveness should 
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have been discovered).  Importantly, Zheng does not allege that he was prevented in any 
way from discovering former counsel‟s alleged errors. 
 Zheng next argues that the Board erred in holding that he did not properly comply 
with the Lozada requirements because he did in fact notify prior counsel in writing about 
the ineffectiveness claim and he notified the bar about counsel‟s deficient performance 
(Petitioner‟s Brief, at 17).  The Board requires that a motion to reopen based on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel be supported by an affidavit that sets forth the 
agreement that was entered into with former counsel with respect to the actions to be 
taken, and that former counsel be informed of the allegations and allowed the opportunity 
to respond.  Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638.  The alien must also file a disciplinary 
complaint with the bar, but this is not necessarily an absolute requirement under our 
decision in  Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 2001).  Zheng points to his 
minimal compliance with these requirements by providing photocopies of certified mail 
receipts.  We doubt that this showing is sufficient to call into question the Board‟s 
conclusion that Zheng did not comply with Lozada‟s procedural requirements.  However, 
even if the Board erred in concluding that Zheng failed to comply with the procedural 
requirements, equitable tolling only applies where the alien has diligently pursued his 
rights.  Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 252-53; Borges, 402 F.3d at 407. 
 Zheng next argues that the Board erred in holding that, in any event, he suffered 
no prejudice as a result of his former counsel‟s allegedly deficient performance 
(Petitioner‟s Brief, at 18).  On the contrary, he argues, he now is ineligible to adjust his 
status precisely because of the immigration benefits bar that applies where an alien fails 
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to depart voluntarily.  Although we need not reach this issue, because, as explained, 
Zheng must show that he diligently pursued his rights and it is not even arguable that he 
has done so, we note, for his benefit, our agreement with the Board that he failed to show 
that any prejudice resulted from his former counsel‟s allegedly deficient performance.  
The test for prejudice in the immigration context is “a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel‟s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Fadiga v. Att‟y Gen. of U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 159 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Board correctly held 
that there is no reasonable likelihood that the result of Zheng‟s case would have been 
different had former counsel advised him about the “failure to depart” immigration 
benefits bar.  Zheng was not eligible for adjustment of status within the ninety day period 
for reopening proceedings, so any errors or omissions in former counsel‟s advice would 
not have changed the result in his case.
2
  In the end, Zheng cannot show that he was 
prejudiced by former counsel‟s omissions because his third motion to reopen was time- 
and number-barred, and because his current prima facie eligibility for adjustment of 
status does not constitute an exception to the deadline for filing a motion to reopen.  See 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). 
 Last, Zheng argues that the Board‟s January 19, 2012 decision is inconsistent with 
its prior decisions in his case.  (Petitioner‟s Brief, at 19).  He argues that the Board 
“abuses its discretion . . . when first it refused to reopen [his] proceedings because a visa 
number has not been allocated to [him], and when it does become available to him, [the 
                                              
2
 As noted by the Attorney General, the Board even stated that the immigration benefits 
bar would have no force in Zheng‟s case because it did not reinstate the voluntary 
departure order in its November 25, 2002 decision.  (Respondent‟s Brief, at 20 n.6.) 
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Board] does not want to reopen.”  Id. at 20.  Insofar as Zheng is arguing that the Board is 
estopped from applying the time-bar because of prior assurances, we reject this argument 
of inconsistent decisions as frivolous.  In its June 1, 2007 and April 30, 2008 decisions, 
the Board merely stated an alternate basis for its decision that rested on the merits of the 
underlying application for adjustment of status.  The Board never once held or implied 
that Zheng‟s first two untimely motions to reopen would have been deemed timely had 
his priority date been current.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  
